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Democracy in Reverse: The 2016 
General Election in Zambia 
Edward Goldring and Michael Wahman 
Abstract: On 11 August 2016, Zambia held elections for the presidency, 
National Assembly, local councillors, and mayors. Concurrently, a refer-
endum was held on whether to enhance the Bill of Rights in the Consti-
tution of Zambia. The elections were significant for several reasons: It was 
the first contest under a newly amended Constitution, which introduced 
important changes to the electoral framework. It also marked a break with 
Zambia’s positive historical record of arranging generally peaceful elec-
tions. Moreover, the election featured an electoral playing field that was 
notably tilted in favour of the incumbent party. Ultimately, the incumbent 
president, Edgar Lungu of the Patriotic Front, edged out opposition chal-
lenger Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development. 
The election was controversial and the opposition mounted an unsuccess-
ful legal challenge to the final results. The 2016 elections represent a rever-
sal in the quality of Zambian democracy and raise questions about the 
country’s prospects for democratic consolidation. 
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Zambia’s electoral history has been peaceful compared to many other 
sub-Saharan African countries. However, the recent presidential elec-
tions in 2015 and 2016 have marked a shift in this trend, with violence 
increasing. The former president, Michael Sata, had a short tenure as he 
died in office in October 2014. In accordance with the Constitution of 
Zambia, Sata’s death triggered the need for a by-election. The vacancy in 
the presidential office led to serious infighting in the ruling Patriotic 
Front (PF) as prospective candidates wrangled to become Sata’s succes-
sor. The party constitution states that a presidential candidate is to be 
elected at a national convention. However, due to the short timeframe in 
which a candidate must be selected, some senior party members argued 
that the nomination should automatically be awarded to Minister of 
Defense Edgar Lungu, who had been appointed acting president when 
Sata had left the country to receive medical treatment before he eventu-
ally died. In the succession struggles, two factions emerged within the 
PF, each of which went on to arrange its own convention. In the first 
convention, Lungu stood as the unopposed candidate for president. In 
the second convention, led by Acting President Guy Scott, several PF 
heavyweights, including Michael Sata’s son Mulenga Sata, Deputy Com-
merce Minister Miles Sampa, Kasama Central Member of Parliament 
(MP) Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, and Commerce Minister Robert 
Sichinga, fought it out to become the party nominee. The second con-
vention resulted in a victory for Miles Sampa. Struggles over whether 
Lungu or Sampa should be regarded the legitimate nominee escalated 
into violence in Lusaka. The matter was eventually resolved in court, 
where Lungu was declared duly elected as the PF nominee for president. 
The 2015 by-election turned out to be a very close two-horse race, 
with Lungu defeating Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for Na-
tional Development (UPND) by a narrow margin of 27,757 votes, or 
1.66 per cent (elections.org.zm 2015). The 2016 election was widely seen as 
a rerun of the 2015 contest, with Lungu and Hichilema remaining the 
only two viable candidates. However, a number of factors created un-
certainty in the election. Turnout in 2015 had been low, as elections were 
held in the rainy season. Also, the 2015 election had been arranged using 
the 2011 voters’ roll. The number of registered voters increased from 
5.17 million in 2015 to 6.70 million in 2016. Moreover, factionalisation in 
the PF caused by the earlier succession struggles had resulted in im-
portant party defections. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, Sampa, 
Mulenga Sata, Sichinga, Scott, and others had defected to join the 
UPND. Most importantly, Hichilema had picked Geoffrey Bwalya 
Mwamba as his running mate. The Bemba-speaking Bwalya Mwamba 
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was seen as a politician that could help the UPND make inroads into 
traditional PF strongholds in Copperbelt and Northern provinces. 
The 2016 election was held against the backdrop of important in-
stitutional changes. The Constitution of Zambia was amended in January 
2016, just a few months before the election, and further changes to the 
Electoral Process Act were enacted in June 2016. The amended Consti-
tution has come under serious criticism from leading Zambian legal 
scholars both for its content and for the executive-driven process that 
created it (Ndulo 2016). The constitutional amendments did not address 
problems related to executive concentration of power. For instance, the 
new Constitution did not do away with the controversial provision that 
enables the executive to appoint electoral commissioners. In fact, the 
amended Constitution enhanced the already great power vested in the 
presidency. A new and particularly controversial provision of the Con-
stitution, Article 81(4), allows the president to dissolve parliament if it 
fails to “objectively and reasonably carry out its legislative functions.” In 
terms of the electoral framework, several new provisions were included 
in the new Constitution. For instance, the amended Constitution intro-
duced the possibility of a second presidential runoff if no candidate 
amassed more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round of voting. 
For nominations to the National Assembly, both the PF and the 
UPND relied on a complex interview process. Candidates who sought 
the nomination had to go through committee-based interviews at the 
constituency, district, and provincial level. These committees made their 
recommendations to the National Executive Committee of each party, 
who made the final decision.1 These processes were a major hurdle for 
female representation. The Zambia Elections Information Centre 
(ZEIC) observed that only 87 women were adopted as MP candidates 
across the political parties – a decrease of 36 per cent from 2011 to 
2016.2 Many women who were approved at ward, constituency, and 
district levels were not adopted when the decisions were made at the 
provincial level. The lack of transparency around nomination procedures 
likely had a negative effect on female representation and reflects a failing 
of intraparty democracy. 
1  Author interview with UPND and PF party officials in Lusaka, July 2016. 
2  Information from a pamphlet obtained at the ZEIC event in Lusaka on polling 
day. 
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Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns 
The 2016 presidential election was contested by nine candidates, with 13 
parties as well as independent candidates participating in the parliamentary 
elections. Given that Lungu and Hichilema collectively received 95 per 
cent of the vote in January 2015, unsurprisingly they were widely perceived 
as the only viable candidates. 
Generally, the Zambian election was not contested on a level elec-
toral playing field (Levitsky and Way 2010). The ruling PF enjoyed signi-
ficant advantages in the campaign period. The Zambian Police Service 
frequently applied the controversial Public Order Act to deny the oppo-
sition the right to hold rallies. Moreover, the PF systematically used state 
resources, like state events and Air Force helicopters, for campaigning 
purposes. The government attracted criticism from the international 
community for its restriction of press freedom. In particular, concerns 
were raised about the closure of the opposition newspaper, The Post, by 
the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) less than two months before 
election day (zambiareports.com 2016a). State media continued to be heavily 
biased in favour of the ruling party. A report issued by the Media Insti-
tute of Southern Africa (MISA) found that the PF received approxi-
mately 45 per cent of the media coverage in the Zambian National 
Broadcasting Corporation’s (ZNBC) TV and radio broadcasting, com-
pared to only about 15 per cent for the UPND (MISA Zambia 2016). 
Zambia has in the past been known for peaceful elections (Strauss 
and Taylor 2012), but in 2016 the PF campaigns – and to a lesser extent, 
the UPND campaigns – were strongly linked to incidences of violence. 
To protect its supporters from violence, the UPND launched a strategy 
called the “watermelon” tactic. The strategy urged UPND supporters to 
be green on the outside (wear the PF’s green campaign regalia) and red 
on the inside (still vote for the red party, the UPND). Ironically, the 
watermelon strategy is similar to the donchi kubeba (Bemba: “don’t tell”) 
strategy employed by the PF in the 2011 election. Donchi kubeba referred 
to PF supporters taking the gifts handed out by the then-incumbent 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) party, without disclosing 
that they intended to vote for the PF. Some notable examples of vio-
lence in 2016 included an event where a former UPND MP and her 
supporters assaulted a Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) 
MP candidate in Namwala (lusakatimes.com 2016f), and an event in Lusaka 
where police shot and killed a UPND supporter (lusakatimes.com 2016d). 
Amid unprecedented levels of violence, the Electoral Commission of 
Zambia (ECZ) took the drastic decision to suspend campaigning for 10 
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days in Lusaka and Namwala districts, two districts especially affected by 
violence. Although the decision to suspend the campaign was welcomed 
by parts of civil society, some smaller parties questioned the fairness of 
the decision as it deprived them of the right to campaign even though 
they had not been guilty of perpetrating violence (muvitv.com 2016). 
In terms of policy, infrastructure and economic issues dominated the 
campaigns. After many years of impressive economic growth, Zambia’s 
serious economic decline in recent years, a devalued Zambian kwacha, 
increased costs of living, unemployment, and closures of copper mines 
have negatively affected Zambians. These economic problems may have 
affected the ruling party’s popularity, especially in urban areas. The PF’s 
electoral strategy was to emphasise the need for continuity and to highlight 
the massive investments in infrastructure in the five years preceding the 
election, especially investment in the Zambian road network. The incum-
bent party went to the elections under the slogan “Sontapo” (Bemba: 
“point”), challenging the opposition to demonstrate their achievements. 
The PF was banking on the new roads increasing their support in rural 
areas that had previously suffered from poor infrastructure. However, the 
opposition maintained that the road projects had been expensive and 
poorly built and had added to a serious national debt problem. The UPND, 
on the other hand, used “Zambia, forward” as their slogan, crafting a 
campaign around a message of change and in opposition to what they 
described as the PF’s policy failures. Hichilema, an economist by training, 
portrayed himself as a more fiscally competent leader than Lungu, stating,  
If your car is broken you go to a mechanic, if your child is sick you 
go to a doctor, and if your economy is broken you go to an econo-
mist. (UPND 2016) 
Zambia also held a referendum in August 2016, concurrent to the legis-
lative and presidential elections, on enhancing the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution. The Constitution had been amended in January 2016 with 
the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, the Bill of 
Rights was not altered in January, as Article 79 of the Constitution dic-
tates that the Bill of Rights cannot be changed without a referendum. As 
well as proposing a new Bill of Rights, the referendum proposed repeal-
ing Article 79, which would have enabled future parliaments to make 
changes to Zambia’s Bill of Rights without a referendum. Although the 
question may seem uncontroversial, the opposition took this opportunity 
to campaign against the amended Constitution in its entirety. Just over a 
month before the election, the ZEIC suggested that many people did not 
understand the rationale, potential consequences, and mechanics of the 
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referendum (lusakatimes.com 2016c). Despite an education campaign by 
the ECZ, the population’s confusion was perhaps unsurprising given the 
wording of the question, the inclusion of two issues to resolve under one 
question (elections.org.zm 2016), and “noise” from the presidential and 
National Assembly elections obscuring almost everything else. The 
broad consensus among academic and independent media observers was 
that this lack of understanding would likely lead to the referendum fail-
ing to garner the more than 50 per cent support from eligible voters – 
rather than simply registered voters – that was required for it to pass. 
Results and Voting 
Voting day 2016 passed with only a small number of incidents. Logistical 
problems affected voting in some locations. However, where polling 
stations did open late it was generally by no more than a few hours, and 
the ECZ made it clear that anyone still waiting to vote at the time the 
polling station closed would still be able to cast their ballot. A more 
serious problem was excessive queuing at many polling stations. Early 
monitor statements interpreted the long queues as a sign of high turnout. 
However, final election results showed that turnout had increased only 
marginally. Stakeholders breathed a sigh of relief in observing that voting 
was generally peaceful. 
The relative tranquillity of election day quickly turned tense, as the 
ECZ started the process of tabulating and announcing results. Before the 
election, the ECZ had made public its ambitious goal of declaring the 
winners within 48 hours of the close of the last polling station. The 
timeframe seemed overconfident, as the election involved five separate 
ballots. The ECZ’s failure to meet the self-imposed target created further 
tension around the results and increased the scope for parties, particu-
larly the UPND, to allege that manipulation was occurring. 
As the presidential results were announced, the lead swung back 
and forth between Lungu and Hichilema. The initial results revealed that 
Hichilema had gained some ground in the areas he needed to improve 
upon from his 2015 showing – Lusaka and Copperbelt – but it was un-
clear if, coupled to his large victories in Southern and Western provinces, 
this would be sufficient. 
The disclosure of the presidential results was rather drawn out, with 
the tallies from every single constituency being individually announced at 
the ECZ, followed by questions from representatives of the political 
parties. One notable incident at these sessions was UPND legal counsel 
Martha Mushipe effectively taking over one session by shouting at the 
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ECZ officials and calling for the director, Pricila Issacs, to resign. 
Mushipe accused the ECZ of working with the PF to rig the elections. 
Her fears were mainly fuelled by reports that a man linked to the PF had 
entered a restricted ECZ area, where he had been able to access the com-
puter system (lusakatimes.com 2016a). 
Table 1.  Zambia General Election 2016, Presidential Election Results 
Candidate Party Votes Vote share 
Edgar Lungu Patriotic Front 1,860,877 50.35% 
Hakainde Hichilema United Party for 
National Devel-
opment 
1,760,347 47.63% 
Edith Zewelani 
Nawakwi 
Forum for 
Democracy and 
Development 
24,149 0.65% 
Andyford Banda People’s Alliance for 
Change 
15,791 0.43% 
Wynter Kabimba Rainbow Party 9,504 0.26% 
Saviour Chishimba United Progressive 
People 
9,221 0.25% 
Tilyenji “Kenneth” 
Kaunda 
United National 
Independence Party 
8,928 0.24% 
Peter Sinkamba Green Party 4,515 0.12% 
Maxwell Mwamba Democratic 
Assembly 
2,378 0.06% 
    
Total registered 
voters 
 6,698,372  
Total votes cast  3,781,505  
Total votes rejected (out 
of total votes cast) 
 85,795  
Turnout   56.45% 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
The final presidential results were announced on 15 August 2016, showing 
that Lungu had defeated Hichilema by a margin of 100,530 votes. This was 
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an increase from the 27,757 votes that had separated them in 2015. How-
ever, Lungu was only 13,022 votes above the more than 50 per cent 
threshold required to be declared the outright winner in the first round. 
Following the controversial events, particularly in the pre-electoral period, 
the results were inevitably contested. For Hichilema, a loss in 2016 also 
meant that he had failed to win four consecutive elections as leader of the 
UPND. The results also showed strong regional clustering of support (see 
Figure 1 below). The 2016 election map basically shows Zambia split in 
two, with the UPND carrying Southern, Western, and North-Western 
provinces and the PF winning Northern, Luapula, Eastern, Copperbelt, 
and Lusaka provinces. Central Province was split. Although the UPND 
made some inroads into the urban areas, the PF was able to maintain its 
urban base – quite a rare achievement among incumbent parties in sub-
Saharan Africa (Boone and Wahman 2015). 
The next significant result announced was the referendum. As ex-
pected, the threshold of 50 per cent turnout was not met, meaning that 
despite the Bill of Rights being supported by 71 per cent of the total 
valid votes, it failed to pass. A notable feature of the referendum was the 
high number of rejected ballots. The UPND did not call for voters to 
reject the Bill of Rights but instead urged them to ignore it, arguing that 
the amended Constitution introduced at the start of the year was not a 
“people-driven constitution” and that endorsing the referendum was 
tantamount to supporting the PF (zambiareports.com 2016b). 
Table 2.  Bill of Rights Referendum Results 
Choice Votes 
Yes 1,852,559 
No 753,549 
  
Total eligible voters 7,528,091 
Total votes cast 3,345,471 
Total votes rejected (out of total votes cast) 739,366 
Turnout 44.44% 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
The PF gained a clearer majority in the parliamentary elections. They 
secured 80 out of 156 seats, with the UPND capturing 58 seats. Geo-
graphical voting patterns largely mirrored the presidential election, with 
the UPND performing strongly in North-Western, Southern, and West-
ern provinces; in these provinces they secured 45 out of 48 seats. Not-
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ably, despite 13 parties contesting the parliamentary elections, only four 
parties in addition to independents actually gained any seats. Nine of the 
14 independents that were successful had originally sought to be adopted 
by the PF or the UPND in the constituencies in which they ran. At the 
time of writing, there have been some post-election defections of party 
officials and candidates, but it remains to be seen how many of these 
independents will align themselves, either officially or unofficially, with 
the PF or the UPND. In any case, the fact of the PF’s majority dimin-
ishes the significance of the issue. 
Table 3.  Zambia General Election 2016, Parliamentary Election Results 
Party Elected MPs 
Patriotic Front 80 
United Party for National Development 58 
Independents 14 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 3 
Forum for Democracy and Development 1 
Total 156 
  
Men elected 131 
Women elected 25 
  
Total eligible voters 6,698,372 
Total votes cast 3,752,879 
Total votes rejected (out of total votes cast) 92,044 
Turnout 56.03% 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
In addition to the regionalised voting patterns described above, another 
notable yet disappointing aspect of the parliamentary elections was the 
low number of women elected. Only 25 female candidates won their 
constituencies. This was despite the PF pledging that over 40 per cent of 
their adopted candidates would be women (lusakatimes.com 2016k). The 
ZEIC found there were fewer female candidates in 2016 – 94 – com-
pared to the 138 that stood in 2011. The UPND had the most female 
candidates, with 29, while the PF, despite the aforementioned pledge, 
fielded only 24 female candidates. The ZEIC suggested that complex 
nomination procedures, where intraparty democracy was lacking, were a 
key factor in the lack of female candidates. The ZEIC found numerous 
cases where women were registered to stand but were replaced at the last 
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minute by men. The frequent violence in the 2016 elections also nega-
tively impacted women, with the ZEIC finding instances of women 
being “stripped naked” when wearing their preferred political party 
clothing (osisa.org 2016). 
Aftermath
The results alone provide an incomplete picture of the Zambian elections. 
Election day was the calm both after and before the storm. Immediately 
following the announcement of the presidential results on August 15, anti-
Lungu riots broke out in Southern Province, which overwhelmingly 
backed Hichilema. Riots broke out in Namwala, Mazabuka, Monze, and 
Choma. Almost 300 people were arrested across those four areas (lusaka-
times.com 2016g). Burning tyres were placed on roads, PF market stalls were 
burnt down, and UPND cadres clashed with the police (lusakatimes.com 
2016h). There were also allegations that UPND cadres had set fire to gov-
ernment offices in Lukulu in Western Province. Despite reports that this 
was due to an electrical fault (wn.com 2016), and despite violence being rare 
in rural areas such as Lukulu, this added to the consensus amongst the 
sympathetic PF media such as Daily Nation and certain radio shows that 
the UPND were to blame for any tension and violence. 
Furthermore, following the crackdown on The Post before the elec-
tion, there were further infringements on private media post-election. 
Muvi TV, Komboni Radio, and Itezhi Tezhi Radio – all independent 
broadcasters – had their licences revoked by the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority for acting in a manner that “posed a risk to national peace and 
security” (lusakatimes.com 2016i). While the results themselves tell only a 
partial story, the geographical spread of the presidential results, illustrated 
in Figure 1, reveals the divide of the country and the clearly regionalised 
voting patterns. There were only three competitive provinces: Lusaka, 
Copperbelt, and Central – all urban or semi-urban provinces. 
The UPND filed a legal challenge with the Supreme Court on 19 
August 2016. The petition claimed that President Lungu was fraudulently 
elected, that his presidency should be nullified, and that a recount was 
required due to the various irregularities before the election, on election 
day, and after the election (lusakatimes.com 2016j). There were rumours 
that, in order to counter potential PF supporters blocking roads to the 
court, hundreds of UPND cadres would be present when the petition 
was handed in. Ultimately, though, the petition was submitted with little 
difficulty, and it turned out to be sufficient to postpone the inauguration 
until the outcome was clear. 
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Figure 1.  Zambia General Election 2016, Presidential Election Results 
Source: Created by the authors, based on the official results presented by the Electoral  
 Commission of Zambia. 
However, in the end the petition was unsuccessful. The Constitutional 
Court ruled on 5 September 2016 that its jurisdiction to hear the petition 
had expired. This was based on wording in the Constitution that stipulated 
that the Court must hear the election petition within 14 days of it being 
filed. The Court was divided 3 to 2 on whether the petition should be 
heard, reflecting the contentious nature of the ruling. On 2 September 
2016, UPND lawyers had staged a walkout in the Court claiming that they 
were given only two hours to present their case (lusakatimes.com 2016l). The 
UPND subsequently filed an application to delay the inauguration of 
Lungu, on the basis that the Court did not declare him the winner of the 
elections when they dismissed the petition (lusakatimes.com 2016b). How-
ever, Lungu was inaugurated as president on 13 September 2016. 
Conclusion  
Overall, the 2016 elections did not contribute to democratic consolidation. 
On the contrary, it is hard not to interpret the election as a step backwards 
for the state of democracy. Before the election, there was a prevalence of 
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election violence, intimidation, closure of independent media, and signifi-
cant media bias. While polling day itself appeared largely successful, the 
post-election period was characterised by additional violence, particularly 
in Southern Province and Lusaka, and further infringement of independ-
ent media. Key institutions failed Zambian democracy. Parties were guilty 
of the various manipulation tactics described above; state media failed to 
engage in balanced coverage, while independent media were frequently 
shut down; the Electoral Commission ran disorganised and slow counting 
and verification processes; and the judiciary oversaw opaque legal pro-
ceedings. In the end, key stakeholders questioned the very legitimacy of 
the election and there was no general acceptance of the results.  
More generally, Zambian democracy appears to be at a crossroads. 
The 2016 election exhibited many of the democratic deficiencies nor-
mally associated with competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and 
Way 2010). There is an apparent risk that the increased levels of violence 
may now be locked into the electoral process, especially given that voters 
did not ultimately reject the main perpetrators of the violence. The high 
level of violence in urban areas was likely used to prevent increased op-
position in the cities. Moreover, and maybe most importantly, the 
amended Constitution further strengthens the executive grip on power 
and reduces the checks and balances in the political system. Scholars, 
civil society, and international actors are likely to keep a close eye on 
future political developments and possible signs of further democratic 
erosion in Zambia. 
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Demokratie auf dem Rückzug: die Wahlen in Sambia im Jahr 2016 
Zusammenfassung: Am 11. August 2016 fanden in Sambia gleichzeitig 
Präsidentschaftswahlen, Wahlen zum nationalen Parlament sowie Kom-
munal- und Bürgermeisterwahlen statt. Parallel dazu wurde ein Referen-
dum zur Aufwertung der Grundrechte in der Verfassung abgehalten. 
Diese Wahlen waren aus mehreren Gründen von besonderer Bedeutung: 
Es handelte sich um den ersten Wahlgang unter einer kurz zuvor überar-
beiteten Verfassung, in der die Rahmenbedingungen von Wahlen erheb-
lich verändert worden waren. Der Wahlverlauf stand im Widerspruch zur 
historischen Erfahrung, dass Wahlen in Sambia friedlich verlaufen. Und 
schließlich war der Wahlkampf von einem beträchtlichen Ungleichgewicht 
zugunsten der Regierungspartei gekennzeichnet. Am Ende gelang es dem 
amtierenden Präsidenten der Patriotic Front, Edgar Lungu, den Heraus-
forderer der Opposition, Hakainde Hichilema von der United Party for 
National Development, beiseite zu drängen. Das Wahlergebnis war um-
stritten. Die Opposition versuchte, die Endergebnisse juristisch anzufech-
ten, hatte damit jedoch keinen Erfolg. So bedeuten die Wahlen von 2016 
eine Wende im politischen System Sambias und stellen die demokratische 
Konsolidierung des Landes infrage. 
Schlagwörter: Sambia, Wahl/Abstimmung, Wahlergebnis/Abstimmungs-
ergebnis, Politisches System 
